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A cut set is a collection of component failure modes that could lead to a system failure. Cut Set
Analysis (CSA) is applied to critical systems to identify and rank system vulnerabilities at design
time. Model checking tools have been used to automate the generation of minimal cut sets but
are generally based on checking reachability of system failure states. This paper describes a new
approach to CSA using a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) model checker called BT Analyser that
supports the generation of multiple counterexamples. The approach enables a broader class of system
failures to be analysed, by generalising from failure state formulae to failure behaviours expressed
in LTL. The traditional approach to CSA using model checking requires the model or system failure
to be modified, usually by hand, to eliminate already-discovered cut sets, and the model checker to
be rerun, at each step. By contrast, the new approach works incrementally and fully automatically,
thereby removing the tedious and error-prone manual process and resulting in significantly reduced
computation time. This in turn enables larger models to be checked. Two different strategies for using
BT Analyser for CSA are presented. There is generally no single best strategy for model checking:
their relative efficiency depends on the model and property being analysed. Comparative results are
given for the A320 hydraulics case study in the Behavior Tree modelling language.
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1 Introduction
A cut set is a collection of component failures that could lead to a system failure. A cut set is minimal if
none of its proper subsets are themselves cut sets. Cut Set Analysis (CSA) is the discovery of a complete
set of minimal cut sets (MCSs) for given system failure modes. CSA, or an equivalent method such as
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), is typically mandated by standards for critical systems (e.g. [11]) to identify
and rank system vulnerabilities at design time.
Traditionally, a system failure mode, or top event to give it its technical name, has to be identified
before CSA can proceed. Model checkers are often used to automate CSA when the top event can be
characterised by a state formula. CSA proceeds by determining if the top event is reachable for various
component failure-mode combinations (the cut sets). Of particular interest are failure combinations that
are minimal (the MCSs). For some modelling notations, CSA has been fully automated [2, 3, 4].
Rae and Lindsay [26] generalised the characterisation of system failure in FTA to violation of a
temporal property rather than simply a state formula. This approach enables a broader class of system
failures to be examined, such as state changes under circumstances when states shouldn’t change, and
action sequences occurring in an undesirable order. While such properties can sometimes be captured by
adding an observer automaton to the model, it is often more natural to state the property as a temporal
property, and desirable not to modify the model [16]. And in other examples the failures themselves are
actually behaviors rather than events or conditions: for example Cerone et al [6] classify human failures
by repeated patterns of behaviour, in a highly interleaved cognitive task where it is impossible to say
exactly when the failure occurred.
Lindsay et al [17] developed a semi-automated approach to CSA with this richer notion of failures,
using Behavior Trees (BT) to model the system with potential component failure-behaviours injected.
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The SAL model checker [20] was used iteratively to identify MCSs, with the temporal property refor-
mulated manually at each step to ignore previously discovered MCSs. The manual steps were tedious
and error-prone. Moreover, in order to generate a complete CSA, the model structure needed to be “flat”,
in the sense that if failure event C1 is preceded by failure event C2 in some path, then there also exists
a path in which C1 occurs but C2 does not. (This is a stronger assumption than simply that failures are
independent.)
This paper describes a completely new approach to automation of CSA, using a new model checker
called BT Analyser, in which search for counterexamples can be directed [13]. As well as avoiding the
need for manual steps and the assumption about non-dependence of component failures, the checker is
significantly more efficient than the one used in [17], with capabilities that go well beyond CSA. The
automation takes advantage of some novel features of BT Analyser including the use of cycle constraints
for counterexample generation, global constraints, and incremental analysis, resulting in an efficient tool
for CSA. This paper also compares alternative strategies for the automatic generation of minimal cut sets
to illustrate the virtues of the novel features of BT Analyser. The approach is illustrated on a BT model
to enable comparison with previous approaches [17] but it is applicable to any modelling notation that
can be translated to a finite state transition system.
• Section 2 describes the modelling framework and introduces CSA terminology and concepts.
• Section 3 describes the LTL model checker for Behavior Trees.
• Section 4 describes the techniques for generating minimal cut sets.
– Section 4.1 describes how a cut set is extracted from a counterexample path.
– Section 4.2 describes alternative approaches for verifying the minimality of a cut set.
– Section 4.3 discusses two strategies for automating the generation of all minimal cut sets.
• Section 5 presents results of experiments on applying the techniques to the Airbus A320 hydraulic
system case study used in [3] and [17].
• Section 6 discusses application of the approach to other modelling notations.
• Sections 7, 8 and 9 discusses related work, provides a summary and conclusion, and discusses
future work, respectively.
2 Terminology and assumptions
The core of BT Analyser works for a very general class of modelling languages, including asynchronous
finite-state systems with interleaving semantics [13]. It does so by using a modelling framework based
on typed multi-variable state transition systems in which the effect of each transition is deterministic (but
the choice of transition is non-deterministic) and the truth value of each atomic proposition in a state is
determinable. Modelling languages that can be translated into this framework include state machines,
Behavior Trees and activity diagrams.
In what follows we assume the component failure modes of interest have already been injected into
the model of system behaviours: that is, the analyst has determined all of the component failure modes
that are going to be analysed and has included events (called basic events in CSA and FTA) corresponding
to occurrences of component failures. The effects of a component failure may need to be reflected in
the system behaviour. However, we do not assume that a failed component remains failed. As usual
for causal analysis techniques such as CSA and FTA, we assume component failures are independent:
common mode failures are analysed after CSA [14].
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For the purpose of CSA, we assume that basic events are encoded using special Boolean state vari-
ables, called basic event flags below. Each of these state variables represents the occurrence of the
corresponding event. Initially, the state variable must have the value false. When the corresponding
event occurs, the value of the state variable must change to true and no behaviour can change the value
back to false. If the analyst’s modelling notation does not support this, it can be easily added during
translation to BT Analyser’s modelling framework. Note that it is the event that cannot be undone, not
the failure of a component.
Given a system safety property Safe expressed in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [25], the model
checker investigates whether there is a counterexample to Safe: that is, a (possibly infinite) sequence pi
of transitions through the model which satisfies ¬Safe. (In fact the model checker looks for paths with
a finite prefix p and an infinitely repeated subpath c, but if there is a counterexample at all then there
is always one in the above form.) Note that safety property in this paper means the formalisation of a
system safety requirement, rather than the narrow technical sense of G¬P for a state condition P.
With the top event replaced by “a violation of system safety property”, a cut set is the set of basic
events that occur in a behaviour that violates the system safety property (a counterexample path for Safe).
The set of basic events that occur in a counterexample path can be extracted from the cycle part of the
counterexample path: they are exactly the basic events whose corresponding basic event flags have the
value true in the cycle (recall that basic event flags can only change value from false to true, so in a cycle
they must maintain their values).
Two different strategies are given in Section 4 below for generating counterexamples corresponding
to MCSs.
3 BT Analyser: A Symbolic LTL Model Checker
BT Analyser is a symbolic LTL model checker for Behavior Trees. It implements novel techniques for
LTL model checking and counterexample generation described in [13]. Although BT Analyser only
accepts the Behavior Tree (BT) notation as the modelling notation, the core of the model checker is
notation-independent.
Novel features of BT Analyser include:
• Directed counterexample path generation with cycle constraints and global constraints.
• Computation of fair states with global constraints.
• On-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking as well as the traditional fixpoint approach to symbolic
model checking.
• Incremental analysis.
BT Analyser is a symbolic model checker, operating on sets of states characterised using propositions
rather than individual states. A symbolic state is a proposition characterising a set of states.
BT Analyser’s framework uses elementary blocks as abstract transitions. The effect of an elementary
block transition is deterministic; the non-determinism is in choosing an elementary block to transition,
when several are enabled.
For each elementary block b, let fb be the function that computes the symbolic image under the tran-
sition (sub-)relation for b and let rb compute the symbolic preimage. If B is the set of elementary blocks
for the system modelled, then the function fB for computing the symbolic image under the transition
relation for the system is defined as
fB(S),
∨
b∈B
fb(S).
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Similarly for the preimage,
rB(S),
∨
b∈B
rb(S).
Propositional operations are performed using ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) [5].
Following model checking convention, let the negation of the system safety behaviour being analysed
be denoted ϕ . During model checking, a tableau (decision graph) for ϕ is superimposed on the model
producing an augmented model (see [13]). The image and preimage functions for the augmented model
are denoted f ′b and r
′
b for an elementary block b and f
′
B and r
′
B for the entire system.
Definition 1 (Symbolic Counterexample Path). A symbolic counterexample path has the form of a triple:
(Ipi , ppi ,spi)
where Ipi characterises a set of initial states, prefix ppi is a possibly empty finite sequence of elementary
blocks, and cycle spi is a non-empty finite sequences of elementary blocks that is repeated forever. A
symbolic counterexample path represents a set of paths in the model that satisfy ϕ (the paths share the
abstract transitions and all satisfy ϕ).
The intermediate symbolic states in a symbolic path can be computed from Ipi and the image functions
for the transitions (the elementary blocks) in the symbolic path.
Directed counterexample path generation allows BT Analyser to be told to find a symbolic coun-
terexample path in which a cycle constraint cc is satisfied by a symbolic state in the cycle part of the
path, and a global constraint gc is satisfied by all symbolic states in the path.
In the fixpoint approach to symbolic LTL model checking, the set of augmented states (states in the
augmented model) that are fair with respect to ϕ is computed. A set of fairness constraints Cϕ is defined
in a manner that is dependent on the LTL encoding scheme. The fixpoint characterisation of the set of
augmented states that are fair with respect to ϕ is
Fϕ , νZ.
∧
c∈Cϕ
r′B(µY.(Z∧ c)∨ r′B(Y ))
where ν and µ are respectively the greatest fixpoint and least fixpoint operators of µ-calculus [12]. The
inner least fixpoint expression characterises states that satisfy Z ∧ c directly or do not satisfy Z ∧ c but
can reach states that satisfy Z ∧ c in the augmented model, where Z is the variable of the outer greatest
fixpoint operation. The outer greatest fixpoint operation interacts with the inner fixpoint operations,
combining to ensure that each fairness constraint c ∈Cϕ is satisfied infinitely often in each path whose
states are in Fϕ . (The overall fixpoint expression characterises states that can transition to states that can
start paths in which each c ∈Cϕ is satisfied infinitely often.)
A symbolic augmented state Sϕ , defined according to the LTL encoding scheme, characterises the
set of augmented states that are “commited” to starting paths that satisfy ϕ . Let Iϕ denote the symbolic
augmented state characterising the set of initial augmented states. The intersection characterised by
Iϕ ∧Sϕ ∧Fϕ
determines if there is a counterexample for the LTL specification: the intersection is empty if and only if
the LTL specification has no counterexamples.
BT Analyser allows the computation of augmented states that are fair with respect to ϕ while satis-
fying a global constraint gc globally. Note that in general this is not equivalent to Fϕ ∧ gc. Instead, the
following fixpoint characterisation can be used:
νZ. gc∧
∧
c∈Cϕ
r′B(µY.(Z∧ c)∨ r′B(Y )). (1)
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The intersection of the set of augmented states characterised by (1) with the set characterised by Iϕ ∧Sϕ
determines if there is a counterexample path for the LTL specification for which gc holds globally.
In addition to the fixpoint approach to symbolic model checking, the model checker also allows on-
the-fly symbolic LTL model checking. The algorithm used is an adaptation of the standard nested DFS
algorithm [9] with the following important differences:
• The adapted algorithm works with symbolic transitions (using elementary blocks) and symbolic
states.
• The adapted algorithm constructs the Bu¨chi automaton implicitly and on-the-fly.
Details of the algorithm can be found in [13].
Finally, an important feature of BT Analyser is the ability to perform analysis incrementally. As an
example, an analysis can start with reachability analysis, followed by computation of fair states, followed
by computation of counterexample states (states that can be part of counterexample paths), followed by
the generation of a counterexample path. We can then tell BT Analyser to find more counterexample
paths as well as fair states with global constraints without redoing the initial parts of the analysis. This
enables different strategies to be used for different problems. An example is provided in [13] where
reachability analysis before model checking is a good strategy for a prioritised BT model (where internal
system transitions are prioritised over external events) but is a bad strategy for a non-prioritised BT
model.
4 Generating Minimal Cut Sets
We assume that component failure modes have been injected into the model. An LTL specification whose
violation represents a system failure is first model checked. If a traditional top event represented by a
state formula top is to be used, then the LTL specification model checked would be G ¬top. Using
our method, G ¬top can be replaced by any LTL formula representing non-occurrence of the behaviour
associated with system failure.
In what follows let ϕ denote the hazardous system behaviour being analysed (i.e., the negation of the
LTL formula representing the desired system safety property).
Cut sets will be extracted from counterexample paths and verified to be minimal. The entire process
of generating all MCSs can be fully automated.
4.1 Extracting Cut Sets from Counterexample Paths
Traditionally, a cut set is the set of basic events that occur in a behaviour leading to the top event.
Unfortunately, LTL does not include events. Even the more expressive temporal logic CTL* (see e.g.,
[8]) does not include events. The occurrence of an event is obviously irreversible: once an event occurs,
from that point on, the event has occurred. A simple way to encode the occurrence of an event is to
use a Boolean state variable, say eOccurred. Initially the value of eOccurred is false. When the event
occurs, eOccurred is set to true and no behaviour can change it back to false. This way of encoding
the occurrence of an event is used by Lindsay et al in their method [17]. We call the state variable for
a basic event a basic event flag. A cut set can be encoded as a conjunction of the basic event flags that
correspond to elements of the cut set.
We can extract the cut set by choosing a symbolic state in the cycle part and pick all positive occur-
rences of basic event flags. As an example, suppose there are 11 basic components that can fail and their
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failure occurrences are represented by the basic event flags
distyF,distgF,distbF,E1F,E2F,PTUF,EDPyF,EDPgF,EMPbF,EMPyF, and RATF.
We will denote the number of basic events MAX. Thus for the above example MAX = 11. Suppose
further that we choose the following symbolic state from the cycle part of the symbolic counterexample
path (taken from an actual run of the model checker on the A320 hydraulics case study):
(Pilot = ready)∧ (Engine1 = on)∧ (Engine2 = off )∧ (Yellow = off )
∧ (PTUy = off )∧ (PTU = off )∧ (EDPy = off )∧ (EDPg = on)∧ (Blue = off )
∧ (EMPy = off )∧ (EMPb = off )∧ (RAT = off )∧¬E1F∧E2F∧¬distyF
∧ ¬distgF∧¬distbF∧PTUF∧¬EDPyF∧¬EDPgF∧EMPbF∧EMPyF
∧ ¬RATF∧ (Green = on)∧ (Aircraft = flyingSlow)∧ (System = operating),
then the cut set extracted from the counterexample path would be
{E2F,PTUF,EMPbF,EMPyF}.
Any symbolic state in the cycle can be chosen, thus we can always choose the starting symbolic state of
the cycle (basic event flags can only transition from false to true, thus their values must remain constant
throughout a cycle).
If the symbolic state has a disjunction (i.e., the symbol “∨” occurs in the proposition that is the
symbolic state), then the symbolic state can be normalised into an irredundant sum of product (ISOP)
form and a cut set can be extracted from any of the disjuncts. In BT Analyser, ISOP forms are generated
directly from OBDDs using the Minato-Morreale algorithm [18, 19].
4.2 Verifying Minimality of Cut Sets
In isolation, if a cut set is extracted from a counterexample path, then it can be checked for minimality
by ensuring that there are no counterexample paths if any member of the cut set is “removed”. This can
be performed in the model checker by computing the set of states that are fair with respect to ϕ with a
global constraint gc representing the removal of a member of the cut set. The computation is performed
using (1). If the intersection of the resulting set of states with the set of initial states is empty, then the
cut set is minimal. The idea goes as follows. Continuing with the example from Section 4.1, suppose the
cut set of interest (denoted cs) is
cs = {E2F,PTUF,EMPbF,EMPyF}.
The gc is a conjunction of all the other components not failing together with at least one of the members
of the cut set also not failing, and for the above cs we would have
gc ≡ ¬distyF∧¬distgF∧¬distbF∧¬E1F∧¬EDPyF∧¬EDPgF∧¬RATF
∧ (¬E2F∨¬PTUF∨¬EMPbF∨¬EMPyF).
The conjunction ¬distyF∧¬distgF∧¬distbF∧¬E1F∧¬EDPyF∧¬EDPgF∧¬RATF represents com-
ponents that have not failed and (¬E2F∨¬PTUF∨¬EMPbF∨¬EMPyF) represents the removal of at
least one component from cs. If the intersection of the result of (1) with the set of initial states is not
empty, then there is a counterexample path with global constraint gc, meaning there is a proper subset of
cs that is a cut set, and thus cs is non-minimal. Otherwise cs is minimal.
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Computing the set of states that are fair with respect to ϕ with global constraint gc is usually much
faster than computing the set of states that are fair with respect to ϕ without global constraints. How-
ever, often this is still more expensive than counterexample path generation. With some strategies to be
discussed in Section 4.3, minimality need not be checked and the number of computations of fair states
can be reduced.
4.3 Strategies for Generating Minimal Cut Sets
Two different strategies for automating CSA are given here: a naive strategy and a systematic strategy.
The naive strategy finds MCSs in no specific order, while the systematic strategy finds MCSs in a non-
decreasing order in terms of size.
4.3.1 Naive Strategy
The steps of this strategy are as follows:
1. Compute the set of fair states.
2. Set gc← true (i.e., no global constraints).
3. Find a counterexample path with global constraint gc and no cycle constraints.
4. If a counterexample path is found, extract a cut set and verify its minimality as described in Section
4.2. If it is not minimal then find a counterexample path for the minimality and extract a smaller
cut set. This can be repeated until a minimal cut set is extracted. Add the MCS to the set of MCSs
sets found and modify gc to rule out the found MCS from further consideration: add the negation
of a representation of the MCS as a conjunct to gc. For the above example cut set, the negation is
¬(E2F∧PTUF∧EMPbF∧EMPyF).
Repeat from step 3.
5. Otherwise no counterexample path was found that satisfies gc globally and all minimal cut sets
have been found.
A proof sketch of the correctness of the strategy is as follows:
• Each conjunct in gc is associated with an MCS already found and rules out any more cut sets that
are subsumed by the MCS.
• In step 4, each time an MCS is found, an appropriate conjunct is added to gc.
• Nowhere else is a conjunct added to gc.
• If there are no counterexamples that satisfy gc then there are no cut sets except those that are
subsumed by the MCSs found in step 4 (since gc rules out cut sets that are subsumed by the MCSs
already found).
Since after step 5 we can conclude that all cut sets are subsumed by the MCSs found, the MCSs found
are exactly all the MCSs.
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4.3.2 Systematic Strategy
As mentioned in Section 4.2, verifying the minimality of a cut set by computing fair states with global
constraints can be expensive. A more systematic strategy that could be more efficient would be to find
all MCSs of size 0, then all MCSs of size 1, then all MCSs of size 2, and so on until we reach size MAX.
This strategy uses the cycle constraint feature of directed counterexample generation:
1. Compute the set of fair states.
2. Set gc← true and n← 0.
3. Find a counterexample path with global constraint gc and cycle constraint “there are n or less basic
events”. For example, suppose there are 3 basic events represented by C1F,C2F and C3F. For
n = 1 the cycle constraint would be
¬C1F∧¬C2F∨¬C1F∧¬C3F∨¬C2F∧¬C3F.
It may be easier to view the constraint as “at least MAX−n basic events have not happened”. It is
equivalent to the standard “choosing MAX−n out of MAX” combinatorial problem.
4. If a counterexample path is found, the extracted cut set would be a minimal cut set. Add the MCS
to the set of MCSs found and modify gc to rule out the found MCS from further consideration (as
in step 4 of the naive strategy). Repeat from step 3.
5. Otherwise no counterexample path was found that satisfies the constraint. If n < MAX, set n←
n+1 and repeat from step 3. Otherwise n≥MAX, and all MCSs have been found.
A proof sketch of the correctness of the strategy is as follows (it is slightly different than the one for the
naive strategy):
• Each conjunct in gc is associated with an MCS already found and rules out any more cut sets that
are subsumed by the MCS.
• Each time an MCS is found in step 3, an appropriate conjunct to rule out the MCS found from
further consideration is added to gc in step 4.
• Nowhere else is a conjunct added to gc.
• If no more counterexample is found in step 3, then there are no cut sets of size ≤ n except those
subsumed by the MCSs already found.
• A cut set found in step 3 is a minimal cut set: the case where n = 0 is trivial; for 1 ≤ n ≤MAX,
we can assume that all cut sets of size ≤ n−1 are subsumed by the MCSs already found therefore
any cut set found in step 3 is a minimal cut set (since they are not subsumed by the MCSs already
found, thus they are not subsumed by any cut set of size < n).
• If there are no counterexamples that satisfy gc when n = MAX then there are no cut sets of size
≤MAX except those that are subsumed by the MCSs already found.
Since the size of a cut set cannot be greater than MAX, after step 5 with n = MAX we can conclude that
all cut sets are subsumed by the MCSs found, thus the MCSs found are exactly all the MCSs.
5 Experimental Results
Experiments were conducted to compare the performances of the two strategies described in Section 4.3.
The naive strategy was then slightly modified, with on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking replacing
directed counterexample path generation, and the performance of the modified strategy compared with
that of the original strategy.
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Table 1: A320 Hydraulics Timing Results
Strategy Initial MC run MCS Generation Total
Naive 8 minutes 57 minutes 65 minutes
Systematic 8 minutes 5 minutes 13 minutes
5.1 Comparison of Two Strategies
The two strategies described in Section 4.3 were applied to the A320 hydraulics case study used in [3]
and [17]. The BT model with the injected faults is included as an example for BT Analyser, which can
be accessed using the DOI 10.14264/uql.2015.16 (it is part of the supplementary material for [13]). The
experiments were performed on a notebook computer with a 2.7GHz i7 CPU and 16GB of RAM running
Ubuntu. The BT model is similar to the one used in [17]. The LTL specification used is
G
(
¬INIT ∨G
( (Yellow = on)∧ (Green = on)
∨ (Yellow = on)∧ (Blue = on)
∨ (Green = on)∧ (Blue = on)
))
where G is the globally temporal operator ( or box), and
INIT , (Yellow = on)∧ (Green = on)∧ (Blue = on).
Both strategies produced the same set of MCSs, although the order in which the MCSs were found were
different. Five 2-element MCSs were found:
{distyF,distbF},{distyF,distgF},{distgF,distbF},{distyF,EMPbF} and {distgF,EMPbF}.
There were ten 3-element MCSs found:
{distyF,PTUF,EDPgF},{distbF,PTUF,EDPgF},{distyF,E1F,PTUF},
{distbF,E1F,PTUF},{PTUF,EDPgF,EMPbF},{E1F,PTUF,EMPbF},
{EDPyF,EDPgF,EMPyF},{E1F,E2F,EMPyF},{E2F,EDPgF,EMPyF}
and {E1F,EDPyF,EMPyF}.
There were six 4-element MCSs found:
{distbF,PTUF,EDPyF,EMPyF},{distgF,PTUF,EDPyF,EMPyF},
{distbF,E2F,PTUF,EMPyF},{distgF,E2F,PTUF,EMPyF},
{PTUF,EDPyF,EMPbF,EMPyF} and {E2F,PTUF,EMPbF,EMPyF}.
Table 1 shows the overall timing results for the two strategies. Both strategies have the same initial
model checking time for the LTL specification which is 8 minutes. The subsequent MCS generation
times differed substantially.
The use of cycle constraints drastically reduced the counterexample generation time. As Fig. 1
shows, the counterexample generation times for the naive strategy started at a high of 490 seconds and
dropped significantly as more global constraints were added. In contrast, the counterexample generation
times for the systematic strategy (which uses cycle constraints) did not vary as much and were quick at
between 3 and 9 seconds (see Fig. 2).
The times for computing fair states with global constraints to check minimality did not vary so much,
as can be seen in Fig. 3. They were between 40 and 60 seconds. In fact, the four cases where the times
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Figure 1: CTR Generation Time for Naive Strategy (26 counterexample paths)
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Figure 2: CTR Generation Time for Systematic Strategy (32 counterexample paths)
were significantly higher were exactly for cases where the cut set turned out to be non-minimal: cases
16, 19, 21 and 24. Interestingly, the performance penalty for those cases were somewhat offset by the
significantly faster counterexample generation times that immediately followed: cases 17, 20, 22 and 25
in Fig. 1. There is no case 26 for checking minimality since no counterexample was found for the case.
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Figure 3: Minimality Checking Time for Naive Strategy (25 iterations)
The results from the experiments clearly show that cycle constraints in directed counterexample
generation can drastically reduce the computation time required to find counterexample paths. Moreover,
cycle constraints can be used to direct the counterexample path generation towards specific kinds of
paths. For generating MCSs using the systematic strategy, the cycle constraint directs the model checker
to find a counterexample path that produces a cut set of exactly the desired size.
The results also show the utility of global constraints. Global constraints serve two purposes:
• to rule out certain classes of counterexamples, and
• to reduce the search space for counterexamples.
The second is a pleasant consequence of the first. Generally, a smaller search space results in faster
search time. The effect is rather dramatic in counterexample generation for the naive strategy (Fig. 1).
Finally, the results show the benefits of incremental analysis described in Section 3. Even a bad
strategy (the naive strategy) is helped by incremental analysis. The computation time using the bad
strategy is still better than the total computation time, using SAL (rerun on the same notebook computer
used for the experiments), of the original approach in [17] (1 hour vs 4 hours). Although there are too
many factors that are not taken into account for a fair comparison, it is clear that not redoing work can
save a lot of time.
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Table 2: Results for Naive Strategy with Symbolic On-the-fly LTL Checking
|ICS| |MCS| CTR Existence Test Total OTF Total Minimality Test
4 3 415.5s 6.8s 141s
6 3 414.0s 21.4s 246.7s
9 2 321.1s 72.2s 833.0s
8 2 271.8s 39.8s 738.1s
9 3 239.8s 81.8s 812.8s
8 2 346.7s 38.6s 781.6s
5 3 262.5s 23.3s 194.1s
5 2 254.3s 25.5s 361.7s
5 3 244.3s 23.5s 266.0s
7 2 230.6s 33.4s 615.0s
5 3 206.3s 24.6s 272.6s
5 3 210.2s 27.5s 196.9s
5 3 201.1s 27.9s 268.8s
6 3 191.6s 28.9s 385.9s
5 4 192.8s 22.2s 166.4s
6 4 190.0s 30.4s 279.2s
6 4 193.1s 28.2s 282.1s
4 3 191.2s 28.9s 128.6s
4 4 169.3s 26.4s 57.8s
5 4 164.7s 31.3s 167.5s
5 4 164.6s 33.4s 164.3s
98.1s
5173.6s 676.0s 7360.1s
5.2 Using On-the-fly Symbolic LTL Model Checking
Recall from Section 3 that on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking can be used to find counterexample
paths quickly. However, the on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking facility in BT Analyser is not as
well developed as directed counterexample path generation. In particular the facility does not yet support
cycle constraints. As a result, the facility cannot be used for the systematic strategy.
An experiment was conducted with on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking replacing directed
counterexample path generation for the naive strategy. In the experiment, the existence of any remaining
counterexample path (and thus any remaining MCSs) was checked first in each round of MCS generation.
This is because on-the-fly symbolic LTL checking might take a long time if there are no counterexamples.
Table 2 shows the results of the experiment with on-the-fly symbolic LTL checking. For each round
(represented by a row), the column |ICS| is for the size of the initial cut set found, the column |MCS|
is for the size of the MCS found, the column “CTR Existence Test” is for the time it took to check the
existence of a counterexample path (by computing fair states), the column “Total OTF” is for the total of
the on-the-fly symbolic LTL checking times, and the column “Total Minimality Test” is for the total of
the minimality test times. The number of iterations for a round is |ICS|− |MCS|+1, thus for |ICS|= 9
and |MCS|= 2, there would have been 8 iterations of on-the-fly symbolic LTL checking and minimality
test in the round. The second last row represents the time needed to verify that there are no more MCSs.
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The results show that, although the total of on-the-fly symbolic LTL checking times (11 minutes)
is much less than the total of the counterexample generation times for the naive strategy with directed
counterexample path generation (57 minutes), the overall analysis time is significantly greater. Even if
we ignore the existence test times for the rounds and use 98.1 seconds as the time to check the absence
of more counterexamples (we can imagine a parallelised implementation where on-the-fly symbolic LTL
checking is run in parallel with checking the absence of counterexamples and whichever result is obtained
first is used, with the other computation aborted), the total time is still around 135 minutes, compared to
65 minutes using directed counterexample path generation.
The disappointing performance when using on-the-fly symbolic LTL checking for the naive strategy
appears to be caused by the depth-first-search with imprecise (but safe) tracking of fairness constraints
nature of the algorithm used. This resulted in counterexample paths that tended to produce cut sets with
many more failed components than necessary. Of the 21 MCSs, only one of them was found in one iter-
ation, with the other 20 MCSs requiring 78 iterations in all. (By contrast, with directed counterexample
path generation, 17 of the MCSs were found in one iteration and the remaining 4 were found in two
iterations.) Thus, any savings from the fast counterexample generation times were completely wiped out
by the times required for the minimality tests.
Perhaps if cycle constraints can be incorporated into on-the-fly symbolic LTL checking, then the
systematic strategy might benefit from fast counterexample path generation times of on-the-fly symbolic
LTL checking without the initial overhead of computing fair states.
6 Discussion
The approach described above, and BT Analyser, were developed in a very general typed multi-variable
transition system modelling framework. The results were illustrated on a translation from the Behavior
Tree notation into the framework but could easily be extended to support other modelling notations,
including state-based notations such as VDM, Z and B. The main restriction is that all sets must be
bounded finite sets and the number of threads is bounded. Note that if the model has a terminating state,
then the state must be replaced by one that has a “null” transition (i.e., it can transition to itself). This
ensures that all paths are infinite.
Fault injection in BT models is usually very straightforward. Although they are all in some sense
equivalent, the BT model of a system can have different tree shapes depending on the order in which
the subtrees corresponding to different requirements were integrated (see [10] for a description of the
BT model development process). If they have been developed so that individual component behaviours
are grouped together by component, which is very often the case, then fault injection is simply a matter
of grafting a behaviour tree corresponding to the component failure mode into the tree, with the failure
(basic) event at the graft point.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a commonly used consequence analysis technique
for critical systems. It consists of checking whether individual component failures can have hazardous
effects on the system. Tool support can be provided for FMEA by injecting individual faults into system
models and using model checking to see if undesirable system states are reachable. Grunske et al [15]
reports experience automating FMEA using BT models and the SAL model checker. Although in prin-
ciple this approach could be extended to CSA simply by injecting multiple faults into the model, one for
each element of a potential cut set, in practice the limits of model checking are quickly reached due to
the state explosion problem. By contrast, BT Analyser can handle system models like those in [15] in
which all of the faults are injected, and it does so very efficiently.
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The generalisation of top event from a failure state to a behaviour allows the approach to be applied
to a broad class of modelling notations, including notations that do not explicitly represent state changes,
such as the BT notation.
7 Related Work
Bieber et al [3] combine CSA and model checking in safety analysis of the A320 hydraulics case study.
They use two different models, one of the static, physical architecture and an LTL model of the activa-
tion and failure behaviour of the system, and need reasoning to combine the results to prove the safety
requirements, whereas our approach uses a single model and the entire analysis is automated.
Akerlund et al [2] propose that reliability analysis such as FTA and verification of safety requirements
be performed on the same model. Their generation of MCSs uses the reachability analysis capability of a
model checker, but is based on a state condition as the top event. The FSAP/NuSMV-SA safety analysis
platform [4] and the DCCA method [21] also use the reachability analysis capabilities of model checkers
to generate MCSs based on a state condition. In contrast, our approach is applicable when the top event
is a behaviour.
Abdulla et al [1] use a SAT-based model checker to find MCSs for Scade models, in which component
failure modes are modelled by replacing nominal flows by extended flows. Again, as with the approaches
mentioned in the previous paragraph, they perform reachability analysis to a state condition.
Papadopoulos and Maruhn [23] construct a fault tree from the design model. Ortmeier and Schellhorn
[22] model the fault trees themselves and verify their correctness and completeness against Statechart
models. Cha et al [7] use the model checker UPPAAL to verify the correctness of fault trees against
timed-automata models. In contrast, our approach does not need to involve fault trees.
Lindsay et al [17] use a model checker to generate MCSs from failure behaviour. However, some of
the steps still need to be performed manually.
8 Summary and Conclusions
We have presented an approach that can be used to generate minimal cut sets automatically from a fault-
injected model and a general safety requirement. The approach takes advantage of novel features of a
new model checker, BT Analyser. In particular, the approach uses the incremental analysis capability of
BT Analyser, directed counterexample path generation, cycle constraints and global constraints. The use
of these features significantly reduces the computation time required when compared to the traditional
way of using model checkers.
Experiments on an existing case study in the Behavior Tree notation show the effectiveness of the
approach and the novel features of BT Analyser. The effectiveness of cycle constraints in producing
counterexample paths with desired properties and in producing them quickly was a pleasant surprise.
The use of constraints appears to help mitigate the state explosion problem in model checking.
9 Future Work
The on-the-fly symbolic LTL model checking facility in BT Analyser is not as developed as directed
counterexample path generation. In particular, cycle constraints cannot be specified for counterexample
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paths. A possible future work would be to incorporate cycle constraints into the on-the-fly symbolic LTL
checking mechanism.
Another possible future work is to incorporate partial order reduction techniques [24] into on-the-fly
symbolic LTL model checking in BT Analyser. This may speed-up on-the-fly checking in cases where
there are no counterexamples.
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